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The CCCS espouses the philosophy of collaborative multidisciplinary practice to promote research, education and patient care in Critical Care Medicine.

 

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INFECTION PREVENTION & CONTROL MEASURES

The following definitions may be used to determine the need to apply infection prevention and control measures.

Influenza-like Illness (ILI)
Influenza-like illness (ILI) is defined as: Acute onset of respiratory illness with fever and cough or shortness of breath with or without one or more of the following: sore throat, arthralgia, myalgia, headache or fatigue. In patients under 5 years of age or >65 years and older, fever may not be prominent. In children under 5 years of age, gastrointestinal symptoms may also be present. H1N1 is a type of ILI and may present with any of the above symptoms.

Severe Respiratory Illness (SRI)
Individuals with SRI have chest radiograph findings of pulmonary infiltrates in addition to the screening criteria noted above.

Other Unexplained Illness
In the setting of a community outbreak we recommend applying infection prevention & control measures for patients presenting with one of:
– Unexplained hypoxemia
– Airspace disease on CXR
– Unexplained sepsis / shock
– Exacerbation of underlying cardiac or lung disease

Institutional infection control measures should incorporate the following:

1. Source Control
2. Accommodation
3. Contact Precautions
4. Droplet Precautions/Respiratory Precautions

A more detailed reference may be found in the Public Health Agency of Canada (28 July 2009) web site.
Interim Guidance: Infection prevention and control measures for Health Care Workers in Acute Care Facilities

Prior to any patient interaction, all health care workers (HCWs) have a responsibility to always assess the infectious risk posed to themselves and to other patients, visitors, and HCWs. This risk assessment is based on professional judgment about the clinical situation and up-to-date information on how the specific healthcare organization has designed and implemented engineering and administrative controls, along with the availability and use of Personal Protective Equipment (PPE).

The PCRA tool can be accessed at The Public Health Agency of Canada website.

2.1.1 Source Control

Source Control includes both Administrative [e.g. patient flow] and Engineering [e.g. glass/acrylic glass partitions in triage areas] means. The importance of applying administrative and engineering controls as the first strategy in protecting the HCW from exposure to infectious agents in the health care setting cannot be overemphasized. Health care organizations should complete assessments of each area of all of their acute care facilities including physical settings (e.g. single rooms, use of partitions, ability to establish 2 metre distance between ILI cases and others), the types of patients seen, and the types of patient care activities undertaken.

Based on these assessments, organizations need to determine what administrative and engineering controls are needed. This is especially important for patient care areas/settings where patients appear for initial assessment/investigation before a diagnosis of H1N1 has been made (e.g. Emergency Departments, ambulatory clinics).

2.1.2 Accommodation for Suspect ILI cases

Patients who have suspected/probable/confirmed H1N1 should be placed in single rooms in the ICU. The decision to develop a H1N1 ward should be made in consultation with each hospital’s infection control officer(s) and performed only for confirmed H1N1 cases. Suitable signage indicating the need and type of precautions required should be placed on the door to these single rooms. Every effort should be made to ensure that the privacy of the patient is protected.

If aerosol-generating procedures are underway, they should be in a negative-pressure isolation room. If a negative pressure room is not available, a portable HEPA unit may be brought into the room.

Stopping precautions must be done only in consultation with the hospital’s infection control officers.

2.1.2 Contact Precautions

Health care workers must where gloves when entering the room of a suspected or proven ILI case. Gloves should be removed just before leaving the room and disposed of in a hands-free waste receptacle. Gowns should be worn as per routine practices. When worn, gowns should be removed just before leaving the room and disposed of in a hands-free receptacle. Use alcohol based hand rubs or soap and water after removing gown and gloves and after leaving the room.

2.1.3 Droplet Precautions/Respiratory Protection

All staff and physicians providing care for patients on Droplet/Contact Precautions must wear the following protective clothing: a fit tested N95 mask*, eye protection (goggles or face shield; eye glasses alone are not adequate), gown, and gloves. Appropriate signage is to be placed at the patient’s bedside to alert staff to the necessary precautions.

*It is recommended that all HCW undergo proper fit testing for H1N1 masks.
Re recognize that some organizations have not recommended the use of N95 masks for the routine care of patients with suspected or confirmed H1N1. Indeed a recent study in the Lancet suggests that there is no evidence for increased risk of H1N1 infection of HCW between those that used routine surgical masks vs N95 masks. However we feel that in the ICU there is risk for unanticipated aerosolization of secretions (accidental ventilator disconnection, suctioning). Consequently the CCCS working group recommends that HCW wear fitted N95 masks when caring for intubated patients with suspected or confirmed H1N1 infection or at any time when procedures that are known to generate aerosols (e.g. bronchoscopy, intubation) are being performed

When suctioning of intubated patients is required, closed suctioning should be used.. Eye or face protection should be removed after leaving the case’s room and disposed of in either a hands-free waste receptacle (if disposable) or in a separate receptacle to go for reprocessing (if reusable). HCWs should perform hand hygiene before and after removing the respiratory protection and after leaving the case’s room.

2.1.5 Isolation

• In the setting of a community outbreak (as determined by your regions public health authority we recommend the isolation (using droplet precautions) of all patients presenting with any one of
– Unexplained hypoxemia
– Airspace disease on CXR
– Unexplained sepsis / shock
– Unexplained exacerbation of underlying cardiac or lung disease

• In the presence of a low level of community H1N1 activity (as determined and defined by your regions public health authority) we recommend the isolation (using droplet precautions) of all patients presenting with, any of recent contact or travel to a high level region (it is recognized that as the background level of H1N1 increases, contact tracing will become irrelevant), new onset cough or fever and one of
– Unexplained hypoxemia
– Airspace disease on CXR
– Unexplained sepsis / shock
– Exacerbation of underlying cardiac or lung disease

2.2 Discontinuing Isolation

Routine practices and additional precautions are to be practiced in the intubated patient from symptom(s) onset until:

– A patient, who presents with suspected H1N1, is later proven to have a negative nasopharygeal and tracheal aspirate by reverse transcriptase (RT)-PCR detection of viral RNA or viral cell culture.

– An H1N1 positive patient, has 2 consecutive negative nasopharygeal and tracheal aspirates performed 48 hours apart by (RT)-PCR or viral cell culture.

– There is controversy about the duration of isolation in a stable, afebrile patient who demonstrates persistent viral shedding. At present we recommend that the decision to remove isolation in this group of patients be discussed on a case by case basis with infection control.

– Due to the potential for prolonged shedding in critically-ill patients with H1N1, a paired NP swab and ETA/BAL needs to be sent at day 7 and as otherwise described above before stopping precautions

3.0 Diagnosis

Initial diagnostic testing is to be conducted in all patients with suspected or probable H1N1. It is recognized that nasopharyngeal (NP) swabs lack sufficient sensitivity to rule out H1N1 infection. Therefore initial diagnostic testing consists of both deep nasopharyngeal swab (NP) AND endotracheal aspirate (ETA)/ bronchoaveolar lavage (BAL) specimens for respiratory viral detection. An endotracheal aspirate (or sputum if not intubated) for gram stain and culture & sensitivity should be sent as part of the initial testing to rule out community acquired/hospital acquired pneumonia.

In a patient with an ILI we recommend the use of real-time reverse transcriptase-polymerase chain reaction (rRT-PCR).

Details regarding the use of Rapid influenza diagnostic testing and the proper procedure for specimen collection may be found on the CDC web site.

Influenza Diagnostic Tests (August 10, 2009)

Nasppharyngeal Swab Proceedure

Due to the potential for prolonged shedding in critically-ill patients with H1N1, a paired NP swab and ETA/BAL needs to be sent at day 7 and as otherwise described above before stopping precautions.

An ETA should be sent for repeat gram stain and culture & sensitivity.


H1N1 RESOURCES & NEW GUIDELINES PREAMBLE

RESOURCE & SURGE MANAGEMENT

INFECTION PREVENTION & CONTROL

TREATMENT

RESEARCH